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To most manufacturing companies technology is a key part of their organisational knowledge, which 
gives them their distinctive capabilities and competitive advantage (Kogut and Zander, 1993). In order to 
best make use of this resource such companies are increasingly extending the application of their 
knowledge through technology transfer.  When transferred internationally this extension of technology 
application is seen increasingly as a means whereby companies can globalise their production operations 
in order to take advantage of cost or market factors (De Toni et al, 1992).  
 
Looked at from the point of view of the host country, technology transfer also has significant benefits. 
For example China has a strategy to rapidly catch up with the industrialised countries in a range of 
advanced technology sectors. However, a major weakness has been the institutional structure in which its 
own research institutes have been operating in isolation from state enterprises, while the latter have had 
very little incentive to innovate. The inward transfer of technology from foreign countries through 
foreign direct investment has therefore been seen as the preferred alternative means of acquisition since 
the "open door" policy was introduced in the early 1980s (Saich, 1989).   
 
In principle, therefore, in the short to medium term, there are complementarities between the strategies of 
European companies and their Chinese counterparts. However, in the longer term, there are concerns 
about the loss of competitive advantages of foreign industries and enterprises to China (Simon, 1997) 
 
This paper examines the question of technology transfer from the perspective of techno- economic 
security, its importance and how companies respond to the possibility of losing competitive advantage 
through misappropriation or leakage.  It explores transfers from Europe to China and addresses in 
particular the operations of Scandinavian companies within the context of the general picture for other 
European firms.  Its point of departure is the situation described in an earlier paper that looked at the 
motivations for transfer and the awareness of companies of techno-economic security issues (Bruun and 
Bennett, 1999). This has been supplemented by new data gathered by the authors from a number of 
Danish and other European companies in China during 2000.  Specific actions have been identified and 
the ownership issue is introduced together with consideration of the role of the companies against the 
Ferdows model (Ferdows, 1997). The analysis shows that the nature of the security question has changed 
together with the evolving context in which the companies are operating.  In turn the response of 
companies is contingent on a number of factors including the time horizon of the strategy for a unit in 
China and the nature of the strategy.  It is also influenced by the form of ownership and management 
style in the particular organisation.  
 
EUROPEAN POLICY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
 
The EU's policy on China is "To engage China further on the world stage, through an upgraded political 
dialogue with the international community, and to integrate China into the world economy by bringing it 
into the world trading system, and by supporting the process of economic and social reform that is 
underway in the country" (EU, 2000). The legal framework for relations with China is currently still the 
"1985 EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement" and an EC-China Joint Committee reviews once a 
year all aspects of Sino-European trade and cooperation relations.  
 
In 1995, the European Commission sought to set out its long-term strategy for EU-China relations in its 
Communication "A Long Term Policy China Europe Relations". This was supplemented in 1998 by a 
further Communication, endorsed by the Council of Ministers, called "Building a Comprehensive 
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Partnership with China", which set out recommendations aimed at upgrading the EU's relationship with 
China (EU, 1998). More recently, in September 2000, the European Commission adopted its Report on 
the implementation of the 1998 communication, which identified activities and progress in the various 
areas of EC economic and development cooperation, and dialogue with China.  
 
Within its 1998 Communication the Commission recognised the importance of promoting foreign 
investment from Europe into China. It states that the development of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
has been a key element in China's economic growth since it engaged its reforms in 1978. For several 
years, China has been the largest recipient of FDI among the developing countries.  Investments 
originating in the Asia-Pacific region, notably from Hong Kong and Taiwan, dominate FDI in China, 
thus highlighting the regional dimension of China's integration into the world economy. The Asian crisis 
during the late 1990s, which reduced incoming FDI in China, makes it all the more important for China 
to attract investment from its other partners, especially Europe and the United States.  
 
The EU's aim is therefore to improve the investment environment for European companies in China. The 
construction of a sound and transparent regulatory framework for investment and a better enforcement of 
Chinese regulations on intellectual property rights are prime examples to achieve this objective.  The EU 
trade policy must be backed up by a comprehensive strategy to promote investment, as well as business 
and industrial cooperation with China, so as to strengthen the European presence in the Chinese market. 
The focus should be primarily on those industrial sectors - such as telecommunications, energy, 
environmental technology and services, transport and financial services - where Europe has a clear 
competitive advantage.  
 
When looking at the actual Foreign Direct Investment figures for China the European policy has clearly 
had an effect and European companies have become the most active investors in China. In 1999 EU 
utilised capital investments totalled US$ 4.472 billion, which was more than either the USA or Japan. 
Four European countries had Chinese investments of more than US$ 500 million in 1999 (Germany, UK, 
France and Netherlands). The three Scandinavian EU countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), 
together with Belgium and Italy, are among the 'second tier' that invested between US$ 50 million and 
US$ 500 million. The third tier (below US 50 million) includes Austria, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece.  Also in 1999 Denmark, Sweden and Finland all increased the amount of utilised capital in 
China, whereas Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, as well as several other European countries, 
actually had lower investment than in 1998.  
On 19th May 2000, the EU and China signed a bilateral agreement, paving the way for China's accession 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Once China joins the WTO, a key challenge for the EU will be 
to develop mutually acceptable methods to monitor and assist with WTO commitments.  
 
TECHNO-ECONOMIC SECURITY ASPECTS 
 
Ensuring security of the technology and protection of their competitive advantage is becoming an 
increasingly important consideration for foreign companies who are investing in China and thereby 
transferring their technology into subsidiary companies or joint venture operations.  The term techno-
economic security relates to the question of how, on a political level as well as on a company level, the 
business potential of the investment can be maintained. In other words companies transferring technology 
to China or other newly industrialized countries need to protect their core technology from 
misappropriation and subsequent imitation when contributing to the country's development and trying to 
strengthen competitive advantage through establishing foreign operations. One of the risks of transferring 
technology is that its absorption and dissemination can, in the longer term, bring about new competitors 
unless measures are taken to prevent leakage of know-how or the technology supplier can stay ahead of 
the technological race. In China this risk may be exacerbated by insufficient legal protection of 
intellectual property rights.  
 
In relation to this issue the EU recognises that its interest vis-à-vis the transfer of commercial technology 
to China has different facets. On the one hand, the EU has an important interest in the sustainable 
development of China. There is the economic aspiration to seize the opportunities offered by the Chinese 
market for EU industry as well as the closely linked political interest in regional stability in East Asia. It 
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can therefore be argued that transferring technology and know-how at low cost in areas crucial to 
sustainable growth is in the EU’s interest. 
On the other hand, the EU has an obvious stake at exploiting its own competitive edge in advanced 
technology by selling its products at commercial prices, in particular on promising markets, like that of 
China. This presupposes, however, the adequate protection of IPR (e.g. patents) an area, in which China 
still has to achieve substantial progress. 
Therefore, the question arises whether the EU should strive for an appropriate balance between the need 
to transfer urgently required technology to China and the need to maintain its own competitive edge in 
the high tech sector. In concentrating on this issue it also should take into consideration the different 
interests of the various players: e.g. the commercially motivated industry (presence on China’s market 
and market share objective) and the objectives of governments (e.g. development objective, maintaining 
EU competitiveness, ensuring employment at home).It is, however, obvious that this question cannot be 
seen in isolation from policies vis-à-vis technology transfer applied by other third countries  
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND CHARACTERISATION OF COMPANIES 
 
Data collection took place through visits and interviews in 11 companies and 1 government institution 
during the year 2000.  Compared with the authors' previous research in 1998, which was based on 
interviews of managers based in Danish parent companies, all interviews and data collection in this 
research have been undertaken in China. Also companies from Sweden and Finland have been included. 
Although they represent only a narrow sample compared to the total number of Scandinavian companies 
who have established operations in China the group does represent a representative selection on various 
dimensions, e.g. of industries related to an EU study on the medium to long term impact of technology 
transfer to China (Bennett et al, 1999), the legal set-up, business functions etc. (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1  The Scandinavian companies in the study 
 
Business functions Company Industry sector Strategic Role Legal 
set-up R & D Production Sales Service 
A Medical devices Server 
/Contributor 
WFOE  (x) x x x 
B Biotechnology 
products 
Contributor WFOE (x) x x  





WFOE  (x) x x x 
E Surface coating 
materials 




Contributor WFOE x    
G Management systems 
software 
Server WFOE   x x 
H Telecommunication 
systems & equipment 
Contributor 
/Lead 
EJVs &  
WFOE 
x x x x 




EJV (x) x x x 
J Base station 
installation materials 
Server WFOE   x  
K Consultancy services N/A WFOE N/A x x 
L General advocacy N/A N/A N/A x 
WFOE = Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise 
EJV = Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture 
x = type of business function in China 
(x) = limited R&D activity, i.e. mainly development and little research 
 4
The interviews were conducted through the use of a semi-structured, open-ended, questionnaire covering 
a wide range of issues relating to the companies' business and operations in China. The general areas 
covered were: 
 
1. General business profile – overall and in China.  
2. Questions concerning the company’s operations in China. 
3. Current situation - overall and in China. 
4. Management of the Chinese operation. 
5. Human resources management and training. 
6. Situation concerning research & development . 
7.   Intellectual property issues. 
8. Criteria against which the European parent company judges the success of its Chinese 
operations. 
9. Additional criteria against which the Chinese partner judges the success of its Chinese 
operations. 
10. Additional criteria against which the Chinese authorities judge the success of the company. 
11. Factors considered important for success of a JV or wholly owned subsidiary. 
 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF TECHNO-ECONOMIC SECURITY 
 
The issue of techno-economic security related to technology transfer to China has a special significance because of 
uncertainty about, and non-transparency of, the legislation compared to Western systems. The issue has been of 
concern from the political level in EU due to agreements with China on support of industrial development, 
including supply of technology on the one hand and a fact of non-adherence to legislation on the Intellectual 
Property Right area on the other hand. This latter can be observed by the fact that in China you see a huge amount 
of fake products in consumer and industrial goods (Business Week, 2000). In the longer term therefore there might 
be a fear that Chinese competitors may emerge and capture world market positions, and that there will be no 
possibilities to sue such for illegal use of technology. On the political level in China there is a deliberate long term 
concern on the importance of technology development in key areas like e.g. biotechnology and telecommunications 
in order to develop the society. Therefore special attention is paid to attract technology and know how in such areas. 
    
On the level of the companies, there might be competing views on the matter. Many companies that are developing 
global production systems see China as a great potential market as well as a base for production and source of 
knowledge. The main background for the establishment of manufacturing, sales, service and research and 
development in China is to deploy and develop the intelligence of the prosperous and hard working young 
generation. This may only take place through in-depth involvement and continuous education, including from 
abroad. On the other hand some companies have learned from experience that competitive Chinese products based 
on the same technologies have emerged in world markets. For the companies this issue might therefore be looked at 
as a “double-edged sword” – either it might kill the prosperous potential if it is too restrictive, or it might kill the 
business if it is too loose. So the research question is whether the issue of security is a matter of concern.  
Furthermore, if it is so, how is the awareness of the issue addressed in the companies, both in general and 
individually? - and can specific activities be identified? 
 
In the following section the elements are derived that enlighten these questions.  The analysis and the discussions 
are framed by looking at various organisational levels: corporate, business unit and the functional level. This is 
followed by a broader discussion of the kind of technology and knowledge involved, the observed transfer 
mechanisms and how the responses to keeping knowledge and technology look. Finally it is shown how the security 






The techno-economics security issue seen from the EU political level and the headquarters perspective was 
presented in earlier studies (Bruun and Bennett, 1999; Bennett et al, 1999). This more recent study has been based 
on analyses in the Chinese units of Western (Scandinavian) companies in China and may therefore have a bias in 
the information gained from local management. The issues dealt with on the corporate level are the unit strategy, 
the legal set-up, and the management lay-out.  
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The overall purpose for the establishment is classified using the Ferdows framework of strategic roles (Ferdows, 
1997). In this framework the site competence is plotted against the strategic reason for the site, split into access to 
low cost production, access to skills and knowledge and proximity to market (see Figure 1). The other interesting 
dimensions are the ownership legal set-up as well as the intended constitution of the management structure and 
team (local, international, style etc). 
 
Figure 1  The 'Ferdows' framework as applied to the company analysis 
 
Paths to higher strategic roles
+ Become a global hub for product 
or process knowledge
+ Supply global markets
+ Assume responsibility for 
product development
+ Make product improvement
recommendations
+ Assume responsibility for 
process development
+ Make process improvement
recommendations
+ Assume responsibility for
procurement and local logistics
+ Maintain technical processes









In accordance with the findings from the authors' 1998 study it is observed that all the companies have a 
long-term horizon for their investments. It is interesting that none of the companies now mentioned cost 
as the primary reason for their current operations in China, although that this factor is seen as an 
advantageous add-on. In continuation it has been identified that the sites have been established primarily 
with a “proximity to market” reason. Although on a simple level at entry the competence level has 
increased quite fast. Among the sample there were identified 3 "servers", 3 servers moving towards a 
"contributor" role, 3 contributors, and 1 contributor moving towards the "lead" position. This reflects the 
fact that these units in China have been chosen as regional East Asian Centres. In accordance with this 
ambitious goals/visions and success criteria are also observed. Overall these positions assume a wide 
range of responsibilities e.g. for development of suppliers, for process and product development, and for 
supply of global markets. Although the issue of techno-economic issue seems to be pertinent the 
potentials and dynamics of the market development seem to overrule this concern. 
 
An observation is that there seem to be a trend away from Joint Ventures (JV’s). Typically the earlier 
establishments started as JVs, but today the Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise (WFOE) is the preferred 
legal set-up among the sample companies. Movements towards a higher ownership share for the foreign 
partner within the JV is also evident, and likewise conversion of an earlier JV to a WFOE by buying the 
shares of the Chinese partner. Other reasons have also been given for this trend e.g. enabling full control 
of the Chinese operation. This presumably also applies to control of the transferred technology.  
In relation to this latter issue a pattern of management structure and style has been recognised. Regarding 
the structure, nine out of the eleven companies in the sample have a mixed management team with 
Western managers in key positions. The aim has been to reduce the number of expatriates and to increase 
local management. On the other hand it may be very important also to keep a multinational team as a 
means of developing towards regional centres with global orientation. An interesting observation 
regarding style is that the companies seem to have adopted a multinational style in the management 
functions, but a conventional Chinese organisation at the floor level.  
Access to low 
cost production 






A general conclusion at this corporate level is that technology transfer to Chinese units seems to take 
place at conditions very similar to all other places. The techno-economic issue is not mentioned as a 
central issue at that level, and certainly it might also conflict with ambitious business goals. On the other 
hand the issue may be addressed implicitly in the way the legal set-up and management structure are 
dealt with today. 
 
Business unit set-up 
 
In accordance with the relatively high positioning in the Ferdows model and the market oriented focus, 
the business units studied represent full fledged production facilities, including sales, production, service 
and to some extent R&D functions. The service function has in more of the companies an important role. 
This relates to the fact that many of the products and their use are new to the market and therefore the 
provision of education in how to apply these is necessary. In the following section the various functions 
are characterised and ways/actions identified whereby the functional structure may contribute to the 
techno-economic security issue. 
 
Production, process technologies 
 
The production facilities in the companies' Chinese operations vary from full lines to part lines consisting 
of assembly/packaging. Overall quality requirements are equivalent to Western standards, and typically 
the production equipment is imported. This may be the latest 'state-of-the-art' version, although previous 
generations of lower technology equipment are also used. The time lag in moving away from the latter 
represents a security aspect, but may also constitute a disadvantage for gaining maximum advantage from 
fully exploiting the technology. Related to the establishment of the local operations companies have to 
obtain a business licence, and in the process of obtaining this is required to submit drawings etc., which 
may then need to be reviewed by government agencies and/or companies appointed by the authorities. 
This “system feature” is mentioned as representing, in itself, the possibility for leaking commercially 
confidential information. However, involving even more risk than this may be the first few years of 
operation. Although not necessarily organised as deliberate espionage, Chinese competitors have 
normally studied the products and processes within the first two years of operation. During the interviews 
examples of factories that had emerged based on new Western technologies were mentioned.  
 
As regards the products there are a mix within the sample of industry sectors and products. On the one 
hand older generation product technologies are offered in the local consumer market (server role) and on 
the other hand the newest ones are available for the industrial and more regional markets (contributor 
role). See the later section on transfer of technology and knowledge.  
 
Sales and Service 
 
Sales and service functions were incorporated in almost all the companies studied, and the importance of 
building good relations with customers was stressed in the interviews. In general these functions are not 
seen as primary sources for leakage of knowledge and technology. On the contrary quite a strong 
emphasis was identified of the importance of service functions, especially in the companies pursuing 
industrial markets. Transfer of the product technologies and their appropriate applications are at the core 




Compared to the other business functions the representation of R&D is more scattered and, except for a 
few business units that are dedicated to this function, a wide variety of activities are involved. The 
picture is generally one of R&D supporting the production function and creating the abilities to develop 
products to meet particular local needs. In all cases development is dominant part of R&D. Most of the 
companies expressed a wish to expand the research part, including by transfer, but have so far been 
reluctant, because they see serious problems in the IPR area. A way to expand the R&D activities has 
been through cooperation with local universities, - the experience of this ranging from being extremely 
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successful to an outcome of varying quality. Related to this, there is a tendency to centralise R&D in 
areas where the best universities can be found. In addition to the quality of research this also has a strong 
bearing on the issue of recruiting the most qualified people. This combination has created excellent 
environments for development with very high growth in prosperous business areas. R&D contributions 
that are not limited only to China, but also for the companies’ global use, have therefore emerged. 
 
There is no doubt that the companies look at the organisation of the R&D function as being very sensitive 
in terms of maintaining and increasing competitive advantage. Presumably this is the way it will be as 
long as there are serious problems in dealing with the IPR issue in China. Keeping the core R&D in 
headquarters and/or spitting up R&D activities among various units are all devices to reduce risks of 
losing core knowledge and technology.  
 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE 
 
Nature of the technologies and knowledge involved 
 
The level of technology and knowledge involved in the companies, especially the ones supplying 
industrial markets, is generally the same as in the US and in Europe. This goes also for sectors known for 
the fast pace of introduction of new products. In order to document the specified level of technology, ISO 
and other quality certification systems have typically been implemented.  
As mentioned earlier some products aimed at the consumer markets may be based on older generation 
technologies, and although the market might be able and willing to buy more high-technology products, 
companies are reluctant to transfer full product processing facilities.  
 
There may be simple reasons for the differences between the consumer and the industrial markets. One 
may be the volume of demand in the consumer market, with China being so huge and the general buying 
power limited, so that the previous generation of technology is in fact considered to be the most 
appropriate for that market. However, the opposite is usually true with the industrial market. Here buyers 
are professional global players who demand the newest technologies and knowledge. 
 
In general it has been observed that an appropriate and a relatively high level of technology is transferred. 
The main mechanism for transfer at that level is the use of experienced transfer teams coupled with 
extensive education and training (3-4 months) of key personnel in the parent company from early-on in 
the project. Considerable on site involvement by expatriate experts also seems to be crucial for a 
successful transfer.  
 
As a special case for building technology and knowledge, the acquisition of competitors with strong 
capabilities were observed. A common and often seen way to transfer certain technologies is through a 
license agreement. However, this was not seen in the cases studied here. In fact, one company mentioned 
that a licence would be its normal procedure for transferring technology, but with China this form had 
been dropped because of the IPR concerns. 
 
Efforts to maintain and amplify transfer within the business unit are pursued by regular visits to 
headquarters and on the job training. 
 
Responses to the security aspect 
 
As a response to the risk of losing competitive advantage most of the companies emphasised some 
important features relating to the product and the technologies involved, namely the concept of the “total 
product package” and the fact that the technologies are parts of greater complex systems. Both represent 
quite similar types of security measure. The total product package could, for example, be based on the 
necessary combination of good quality products, attractive delivery forms and outstanding service. 
Although technologies would be part of this, the total package would in fact comprise much more and, as 
such, it would be difficult to imitate. 
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Similarly it can be argued that developing even the most "high-tech" solution from an R&D function may 
have an isolated value, especially if the solution is only a part that will be integrated into a greater 
system. Therefore an R&D unit might deal with very sophisticated technology without compromising the 
company and its products. 
 
Other forms of response to the security aspect are related to human resource management and will 
typically take account of the Chinese culture, e.g. showing respect at all levels, and the type of job and 
persons involved. Pertinent for the security issue are management and R&D levels. For both of these the 
creation of an attractive working environment was identified as a major action for the preservation of 
technology and knowledge. An open atmosphere and communication, where employees are invited to 
take responsibility, means that they trust and protect their company. If for any reason a person wishes to 
terminate their employment, most of the companies have their rules, e.g. prohibiting the removal of 
technology from the company. Furthermore there are legal rules, according to which, for example, the 
company can for a 2-year period be entitled to retain the work permit of an employee who wants to join a 
competitor.  
 
In a broader context all companies stressed the importance of adapting to the local community and 
actively demonstrating the behaviour of a good corporate citizen. This adds credibility and contributes to 




It is clear that possible threats to Europe arise from losing the technological lead to China in some 
sectors. However the Scandinavian and other European companies that have been investigated are aware 
of this threat and realistic about the length of technological lead they have over potential Chinese 
competitors. Their most important strategy appears to be to maintain a lead over potential competitors 
through R&D. European firms also have to form their strategies in the context of competition from the 
US, Japan and East Asia. Therefore, as long as there are no hard security issues, it is reasonable to start 
from the premise that firms are in the best position to make their own decisions on technology transfer 
and collaborations in China to enable them to best access the Chinese market and use China as a base for 
production and R&D activities. 
 
However, there are two areas in which policies and initiatives at the European Union level could protect 
the interests of European firms. These are protection of intellectual property and Chinese trade 
liberalisation. Inadequate protection of their intellectual property in China was a concern raised by a 
number of companies involved in this study. Adequate formal institutional arrangements and a legal 
framework are now in place for the protection of intellectual property. According to Schlesinger (1997), 
China has attained a high level of compliance with the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and that 
there is an emerging legal culture in China, characterised by a strengthening of the judiciary and greater 
compliance with written laws. China will have to fully comply with TRIPs as a condition of joining the 
WTO (World Trade Organisation).   
 
However, the situation on using the IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) protection framework is less clear. 
While the Chinese authorities have been active in dealing with a few high profile areas such as music 
CD-ROMs and software, enforcement overall is constrained by limited resources and administrative 
complexity (Potter and Oksenberg, 1999 and Simone, 1999). Further, the alternative avenues for dealing 
with infringements and levels of compensation are still not fully understood by foreign firms. Where a 
foreign company has transferred whole or part of technology to be used within the context of a transfer 
agreement, defending IPR often requires a combination of trademark, patent and copyright protection 
measures (Fawlk, 1996).  
 
The annex on Intellectual Property Rights to the "Agreement for Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation Between the European Community and the Government of the People's Republic of China" 
(OJEC, 2000) is contributing to the progress China is making on protecting IPR in its bid to join the 
WTO. For companies, even if the framework for legal protection for IPR is adequate, the costs associated 
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with vigilance, taking legal action and pursuing enforcement can be large. Therefore, providing European 
companies, both established in China as well as new to the country, with a better understanding of the 
IPR regime and the possible risks and pitfalls is an important role at the European level. The continuing 
dialogue between the European Union and China can also be used to raise any issues on the 
implementation of the IPR regime. To be able to do both these effectively, it is necessary to improve an 
understanding of the actual problems and issues encountered by European firms operating in China and, 
in particular, transferring technology. One of the specific recommendations of this report therefore is the 
setting up of a policy and consultative panel of European businesses and research organisations with 
experience in China. 
 
The second aspect is trade liberalisation. China’s acquisition of technological capabilities, leading to 
success in export markets and better economic growth, do not have to be at the expense of Europe. Better 
economic performance in China should lead to more trade with foreign countries and if European firms 
develop business relationships in China they will be in a better position to gain from its success. For 
example, in the telecommunications equipment sector, China is becoming a large exporter but remains a 
net importer. In this respect, European Union policy to support China’s membership of WTO and the 
liberalisation of trade and foreign investment policies as conditions of WTO membership should further 
benefit European firms.  
 
Before China joins the WTO, the European Union should continue to put pressure on China to be more 
transparent in its policy on the local sourcing and technology transfer conditions. When China joins the 
WTO, under the agreement on trade related investment measures (TRIMs), local sourcing requirements 
will not be permitted (Daniels, King and Bernstein, 1995; WTO, 1999).  
 
However, the WTO agreements do not at present encompass conditions imposed on foreign investors 
(such as requirements to transfer technology and form joint ventures with local partners in some sectors) 
or incentives and subsidies for investors. It is likely that China and other countries will continue to 
impose conditions on foreign investors and offer incentives to them. Foreign investors may also comply 
with the conditions imposed if they fear loss of opportunity to competitors willing to comply with the 
conditions. Therefore, there is a continuing role at the European Union level in securing greater 
transparency in the regulations affecting European companies and pressure to reduce the restrictions. The 
recommended policy and consultative panel of European businesses and research institutes would also 
have a role in identifying the issues on regulations and their implementation which affect European 
businesses in China.   
 
There have been some concerns about European competitiveness in advanced technology sectors, not in 
relation to China at this stage, but in relation to the US, Japan and the Asian NICs. However, a limited 
examination of recent evidence shows that, based on strengths in the sectors represented by several of the 
companies studied (e.g. medical devices, pharmaceutical products and telecommunications equipment) 




Looking back at the situation now compared with the early days after the introduction of the “open door” 
policy a clear change with regard to the security aspects can be seen. Often the technologies transferred 
previously were the older generation types, and the established units were representatives of the lower 
levels in the Ferdows model, e.g. offshore and server types through the use of Joint Ventures and licences 
for limited time periods. Over the years the context of operations has evolved, e.g. we see that the 
business units are now aiming for higher positions in the model implying a greater degree of 
independence and competence and based on a long-term strategy. This seems to be of mutual interest 
both to companies and society within the objective of growth in business and the creation of welfare 
benefits for employees. At the same time it has also increased the sensitivity towards the security issue. 
Obligations associated with the society side of this equation have included the implementation of 
Western inspired laws and regulations, while on the company side there is the wish to increase 
competitive advantage and, at the same time, sharpen the awareness of the security issues. In turn, this 
seems to have resulted in a change in the form of ownership, e.g. towards the wholly foreign owned 
 10
enterprise, in order to structure and manage the organisation and its functions, and ultimately as a way of 
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